Defendant Raymond Anguiano, Sr., appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered after a jury trial. The jury found Anguiano guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon; possession of methamphetamine; possession of heroin; resisting, obstructing, or delaying an officer; and street terrorism.
Anguiano's street terrorism conviction is based on his possession of personal use amounts of methamphetamine and/or heroin, and his resisting an officer. The evidence that the prosecution presented to prove the street terrorism charge is that Anguiano was sitting alone, on a porch, when he noticed police officers approaching him. Anguiano attempted to flee from the officers and threw the drugs over a fence. It is undisputed that Anguiano, a documented gang member, was alone at the time, and that his possession of personal use quantities of drugs or resisting the officers was not related to his gang.
On appeal, Anguiano argues that (1) there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for street terrorism; (2) the trial court erred in failing to grant a new trial with respect to the count charging him with street terrorism; (3) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree on which act formed the basis of the street terrorism offense; (4) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that it could rely on misdemeanor conduct as the "felonious" conduct necessary to support a conviction for street terrorism; (5) the trial court erred in not granting a new trial on the ground that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to bring a motion to suppress the gunshot residue found on Anguiano, relating to the firearm he was found guilty of possessing; (6) the trial court did not understand that it possessed the discretion to strike only some, and not all, of Anguiano's prior strike convictions; and (7) he was not validly convicted of a serious or violent felony in the present case because only the street terrorism offense constitutes a serious or violent felony and, he maintains, there was insufficient evidence to support that conviction, such that the court erred in imposing the three 5-year terms pursuant to Penal Code
We conclude that there is insufficient evidence to support Anguiano's conviction for street terrorism, and we reverse his conviction for that offense. Anguiano's possession of personal use quantities of drugs while alone on the porch is not the type of felonious conduct that the Legislature intended to include within the meaning of subdivision (a) of section 186.22.
In the late afternoon of January 12, 2005, law enforcement officers were driving to a home in Rancho Cucamonga to perform a parole check on Anguiano's nephew. The officers were wearing plain clothes and were driving an unmarked vehicle. As the officers neared the nephew's residence, they saw Anguiano and another man walking toward the residence. Deputy Joe Braattan and Parole Agent Ardrick Elmore recognized Anguiano from previous contacts with him. Anguiano made eye contact with the officers, dropped a bowl of soup that he had been eating, and started running away. Braattan and Elmore jumped out of the vehicle and began to chase Anguiano.
Anguiano first ran north, then turned a corner and ran through an open gate. Deputy Braattan caught up with Anguiano and ordered him to stop, but
Agent Elmore caught up with Anguiano, drew his gun, and ordered Anguiano to drop to the ground. Anguiano stopped running, but did not comply with the order to get on the ground. Deputy Braattan then used a Taser to stun Anguiano and ultimately apprehended him.
After officers detained Anguiano, Deputy Braattan retraced the path that Anguiano had taken during the chase. Along the route, Braattan found a semiautomatic handgun, a loaded ammunition clip with one expended round, and a cigarette lighter. Braattan did not see any dirt, moisture or other debris on any of these items.
Officers transported Anguiano to the police station where his blood was drawn and he was tested for gunshot residue. Anguiano's blood tested positive for methamphetamine, cocaine, and opiates consistent with heroin. In addition, "one unique" particle of gunshot residue was found on Anguiano's left hand.
On the morning of February 1, 2005, several law enforcement officers drove to the same residence in Rancho Cucamonga in order to perform a parole check on another of Anguiano's nephews. After parking their vehicle nearby, the officers started to walk toward the house and saw Anguiano sitting on the front porch, looking down at something in his hands.
Several officers chased Anguiano through the house and out the back door, into the backyard. Anguiano threw a cell phone and some plastic bags over a fence. Deputies apprehended Anguiano near a garage in back of the house.
In his pockets, Anguiano had a syringe, a spoon with a cotton ball stuck to it, and a bag of marijuana. Anguiano also had two marks on his forearm that appeared to be fresh needle injection sites that were bleeding. Deputy Paul Gallant recovered the cell phone and bags that Anguiano had tossed over the fence. The bags contained usable amounts of methamphetamine, heroin, and marijuana.
Anguiano was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1); count 1); possession of a firearm while under the influence (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (e); count 2); possession of a controlled substance, i.e., methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count 3); possession of a controlled substance, i.e., heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a); count 4); resisting an executive officer (§ 69; count 5); and street terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 6). Counts 1 and 2 related to the events of January 12, 2005, while counts 3 through 6 related to the February 1, 2005 incident.
The information alleged that Anguiano committed count 1, possession of a firearm by a felon, for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)). In addition, the information alleged that Anguiano had served four prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), that he had eight prior strike convictions (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)), and that he had been convicted of three prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
Jury trial commenced on September 24, 2007. The jury found Anguiano guilty on counts 1, 3, 4 and 6, as charged. With respect to count 5, the jury found Anguiano guilty of the lesser included offense of resisting, obstructing or delaying an officer in violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1).
The trial court found all of the alleged prior conviction allegations to be true. Anguiano filed a motion for a new trial, which the court denied.
The trial court sentenced Anguiano to 25 years to life on count 6, and added three consecutive five-year enhancements for three prior serious felony convictions. The court imposed an additional consecutive term of 25 years to life with respect to count 3, plus four years for the four prison priors, as well as a concurrent term of 25 years to life plus four years with respect to count 4. With respect to count 1, the trial court imposed and stayed (pursuant to § 654) a term of 25 years to life plus four years.
Anguiano raises several grounds for reversing his convictions on counts 1 and 6, and also raises claims of error related to his sentence.
We conclude that there is insufficient evidence to support Anguiano's conviction for street terrorism as alleged in count 6. We therefore reverse his conviction on that count.
Subdivision (a) of section 186.22 states in pertinent part: "Any person who actively participates in any criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail ... or ... state prison ...."
Subdivision (b)(1) of section 186.22 provides, with certain exceptions not relevant here, that "any person who is convicted of a felony committed for
The two subdivisions thus identify and penalize different aspects of criminal gang involvement. The substantive offense of street terrorism defined in section 186.22, subdivision (a) has three elements: "[(1)] Active participation in a criminal street gang, in the sense of participation that is more than nominal or passive .... [(2)] ... `[K]nowledge that [the gang's] members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity,' and [(3)] ... `willfully promot[ing], further[ing], or assist[ing] in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang.' (§ 186.22(a).)" (People v. Lamas (2007) 42 Cal.4th 516, 523 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 179, 169 P.3d 102].) The enhancement provision in subdivision (b)(1) also has three elements (with exceptions not relevant for our purposes here): (1) conviction of a predicate felony, (2) committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang, and (3) with the specific intent to promote, further or assist in any criminal conduct by criminal street gang members. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).)
Anguiano was convicted of the substantive offense of street terrorism, under subdivision (a) of section 186.22. Anguiano does not dispute that there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to support the first two elements of that offense — i.e., that he was an active participant in a criminal street gang, and that he had knowledge that his gang's members engaged in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity. However, Anguiano contends that there was not sufficient evidence that in committing the offenses charged in this case, he "willfully promote[d], further[ed], or assist[ed] in ... felonious criminal conduct by members of [his] gang" (§ 186.22, subd. (a)).
The question that this case presents is whether a defendant can be convicted of street terrorism under section 186.22, subdivision (a) where the evidence shows only that the defendant, a gang member, was the sole perpetrator of a felony (i.e., possession of personal use quantities of methamphetamine and heroin),
The Supreme Court has determined that the "felonious criminal conduct by members of [the defendant's] gang" referenced in section 186.22, subd. (a) need not be "gang-related" felonious conduct. (See Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 55.) ["The plain language of the statute ... targets felonious criminal conduct, not felonious gang-related conduct."].) However, the defendants in Albillar were all gang members who acted together to commit a rape. (See id. at p. 54.) Indeed, the Supreme Court in Albillar discussed the fact that a literal reading of the statute to include non-gang-related felonious conduct does not yield absurd results because "there is nothing absurd in targeting the scourge of gang members committing any crimes together and not merely those that are gang related." (Id. at p. 55, some italics added.) Albillar thus does not directly answer the question presented here — i.e., whether a gang member may be convicted of street terrorism for non-gang-related conduct in which he engaged by himself. However, Albillar suggests that a gang member who engages in non-gang-related conduct by himself is not the target of subdivision (a) of section 186.22, since the problem that the Legislature intended to address in enacting the statute is that of gang members committing crimes in concert.
Other published cases interpreting section 186.22, subdivision (a) further demonstrate that the felonious conduct at issue in this case is not the type of felonious conduct that can support a conviction for street terrorism. In People v. Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 906, 3 P.3d 278] (Castenada), one of the leading cases construing section 186.22, subdivision (a), the court addressed the meaning of the phrase "actively participates." The Castenada court explained that in adopting this legislation, the Legislature was cognizant of the ruling in Scales v. United States (1961) 367 U.S. 203 [6 L.Ed.2d 782, 81 S.Ct. 1469], "that `mere association with a group cannot be punished unless there is proof that the defendant knows of and intends to further its illegal aims.'" (Castenada, supra, at p. 749.) The court continued, "This explains why the Legislature expressly required in section 186.22[, subdivision](a) that a defendant not only `actively participates' in a criminal street gang ..., but also that the defendant does so with `knowledge that [the gang's] members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity,' and that the defendant `willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any
Castenada therefore suggests that an active gang member who commits a non-gang-related felony by himself would not be guilty of street terrorism.
In People v. Ngoun (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 432 [105 Cal.Rptr.2d 837] (Ngoun), decided after Castenada, the court concluded that it would be inconsistent with the objective and the intent of section 186.22, subdivision (a) to restrict its language to apply only to aiders and abettors, and not read it to also include direct perpetrators of felonious conduct. The Ngoun court reasoned: "Under the language of subdivision (a), liability attaches to a gang member who `willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang.' (§ 186.22, subd. (a).) In common usage, `promote' means to contribute to the progress or growth of; `further' means to help the progress of; and `assist' means to give aid or support. (Webster's New College Dict. (1995) pp. 885, 454, 68.) The literal meanings of these critical words squares with the expressed purposes of the lawmakers. An active gang member who directly perpetrates a gang-related offense `contributes' to the accomplishment of the offense no less than does an active gang member who aids and abets or who is otherwise connected to such conduct. Faced with the words the legislators chose, we cannot rationally ascribe to them the intention to deter criminal gang activity by the palpably irrational means of excluding the more culpable and including the less culpable participant in such activity." (Ngoun, supra, at p. 436.)
We agree with the Ngoun court that there is no reasonable basis, textual or otherwise, to conclude that the Legislature intended to attach liability under section 186.22, subdivision (a) solely to aiders and abettors and not to direct perpetrators. However, Ngoun, like Albillar, does not answer the question that this case presents. In Ngoun, the defendant "went with other Modesto Hit Squad members to a party where he knew other rival gang members would be," and, while at the party, fired into a crowd of people that included members of a rival gang who had "`disrespected'" him earlier in the evening. (Ngoun, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 437.) At the party, prior to
Later, in People v. Salcido (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 356 [56 Cal.Rptr.3d 912] (Salcido), the court, relying on Ngoun, concluded that section 186.22, subdivision (a) "includes perpetrators of felonious gang-related criminal conduct." (Salcido, supra, at p. 370.) The felonious conduct that formed the basis for the section 186.22, subdivision (a) conviction in Salcido included unlawful possession of a loaded firearm and other weapons, offenses that the defendant committed by himself. (Salcido, supra, at p. 359.) On appeal, Salcido contended that the trial court had erred by modifying CALCRIM No. 1400 (the standard jury instruction for the crime of active participation in a criminal street gang) to state that a defendant willfully promotes, furthers, or assists felonious criminal conduct under section 186.22, subdivision (a) "`by either directly and actively committing a felony offense or aiding and abetting felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang.'" (Salcido, supra, at pp. 365-366.)
The Salcido court affirmed the defendant's conviction, concluding that the trial court had properly modified the instruction. In reaching this conclusion, the Salcido court reasoned, "Here, if the evidence proved any criminal conduct by Salcido, it was only as the perpetrator of the crimes establishing the felonious criminal conduct with which he was charged. This conduct included illegal possession of a weapon, receiving stolen property, carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle, or carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle. Faced with CALCRIM No. 1400 which defines when a defendant willfully assists, furthers, or promotes a crime only in terms of whether the defendant aided and abetted another gang member in the commission of a crime, the trial court appropriately omitted that portion of the instruction. Instead, it told the jury it must find that Salcido `willfully promoted, furthered or assisted by either directly and actively committing a felony offense or aiding and abetting felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang.' (Italics added.) As a result, the court correctly instructed the jury that Salcido could be convicted of the crime if he was a direct perpetrator of the felonious criminal conduct. Although the court never defined the terms `aiding and abetting,' this did not
The Salcido court appears to have assumed that the felonious conduct that formed the basis of the defendant's conviction for street terrorism was gang-related conduct (as was the conduct engaged in by the defendant in Ngoun): "[A]s we concluded in Ngoun, section 186.22, subdivision (a), cannot be read so narrowly [as to only cover aiders and abettors] and includes perpetrators of felonious gang-related criminal conduct." (Salcido, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 370, italics added.) Although the Salcido court noted that "there was no evidence [that the known gang members who accompanied Salcido] participated in Salcido's crimes," the court continued, "however, `[t]he evidence supports a reasonable inference that the [crimes] were intended by [the defendant] to promote, further and assist the gang in its primary activities — the commission of criminal acts and the maintenance of gang respect.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 368.)
More recently, the court in People v. Sanchez (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1297 [101 Cal.Rptr.3d 639] (Sanchez), followed Ngoun and Salcido, and rejected the defendant's contention that section 186.22, subdivision (a) "`imposes liability on perpetrators only if they commit the crime in concert with other gang members.'" (Sanchez, supra, at p. 1308.) In Sanchez, the defendant, who was a gang member, and an accomplice, who was not a gang member, robbed a pizza parlor. (Ibid.) The defendant was convicted of second degree robbery and of violating section 186.22, subdivision (a). (Sanchez, supra, at p. 1301.) The defendant argued on appeal that he could not be guilty under section 186.22, subdivision (a) because he was a direct perpetrator, not an aider and abettor, of the charged robbery. (Sanchez, supra, at pp. 1305, 1306.) Citing Ngoun, the appellate court rejected that argument, concluding that "a gang member who perpetrates a felony by definition also promotes and furthers that same felony." (Id. at p. 1307.)
The Sanchez court proceeded to identify a related argument that the court described as "lurking" in the case (but which the defendant had not raised and the parties had not briefed), i.e., that the defendant could not have promoted, furthered, or assisted felonious criminal conduct by gang members because the accomplice was not a member of a gang. (Sanchez, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 1307 ["One could argue that this element cannot be satisfied by evidence that the defendant perpetrated a felony alone or with nongang members (such as defendant's cousin)."].) The Sanchez court deemed the argument forfeited, but stated, without further analysis or explanation, "[e]ven if it had been raised, however, we would reject it on the authority of Salcido." (Id. at p. 1308.)
Anguiano contends that his trial court rendered ineffective assistance by failing to bring a motion to suppress the gunshot residue found on him immediately after the January 12, 2005 incident. According to Anguiano, if his attorney had made such a motion, the court would likely have granted it because the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him on January 12, 2005. We conclude that Anguiano's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance in failing to bring this motion because doing so would have been futile.
During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the gunshot residue found on Anguiano constituted evidence that he had possessed a gun. The jury ultimately convicted Anguiano of count 1, possession of a firearm by a felon. Anguiano subsequently fired his trial counsel. His new trial attorney filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that Anguiano's former attorney had provided ineffective assistance by failing to move to suppress the results of the gunshot residue test that was performed after Anguiano's January 12, 2005 arrest. At a hearing, Anguiano's former attorney testified that Anguiano had asked him to move to suppress the gunshot residue test results. The attorney stated that he had not filed a motion to suppress the results of the gunshot residue test because he believed that a motion to suppress would not have been granted. Specifically, the attorney believed that since police had found the gun prior to arresting Anguiano, along Anguiano's flightpath, the gun could not have been found as a result of the arrest. The trial court determined that a motion to suppress would not have been meritorious, and denied Anguiano's new trial motion.
On appeal, Anguiano contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial because his original trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move to suppress the gunshot residue evidence.
"In determining whether counsel's performance was deficient, we exercise deferential scrutiny. [Citations.] The appellant must affirmatively show counsel's deficiency involved a crucial issue and cannot be explained on the basis of any knowledgeable choice of tactics. [Citation.] [¶] Our Supreme Court recently reiterated the obligations of appellate courts in reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: `"`Reviewing courts defer to counsel's reasonable tactical decisions in examining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel [citation], and there is a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of professional assistance."' [Citation.] `[W]e accord great deference to counsel's tactical decisions' [citation], and we have explained that `courts should not second-guess reasonable, if difficult, tactical decisions in the harsh light of hindsight' [citation]. `Tactical errors are generally not deemed reversible, and counsel's decisionmaking must be evaluated in the context of the available facts.' [Citation.]"' [Citation.]
"`Competent counsel is not required to make all conceivable motions or to leave an exhaustive paper trail for the sake of the record. Rather, competent counsel should realistically examine the case, the evidence, and the issues, and pursue those avenues of defense that, to their best and reasonable professional judgment, seem appropriate under the circumstances. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Montoya, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1147-1148.)
Anguiano cannot establish that his original trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to move to suppress the gunshot residue because, as the trial court determined, any such motion would have been futile.
There was thus no basis to suppress the gunshot residue evidence on the ground that officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Anguiano when they seized him on January 12, 2005. Consequently, any motion to suppress the evidence on this ground would have been denied, and Anguiano's counsel could not have been ineffective in not making a futile motion. We therefore reject Anguiano's contention that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for a new trial on the ground that his original trial attorney failed to move to suppress the gunshot residue evidence, and affirm Anguiano's conviction on count 1 for possession of a firearm by a felon.
We reverse Anguiano's conviction on count 6. The matter is remanded to the trial court for resentencing on the remaining counts.
Haller, Acting P. J., and Irion, J., concurred.
